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1 Abstract
Currently cryptocurrencies play an important role in our society. Their popularity
has increased hugely in recent years and, consequently, they have attracted the atten-
tion of an important segment of the population, which frequently finds in themining
of these cryptographic currencies a new opportunity to earn money. However, this
has brought a new scenario where some people use hijacked resources to mine for
their own profit. In this context, it is crucial to detect when a host is infected by
malware that mines cryptocurrency without permission. Nowadays, there are some
approaches to solve this problem: checking the content of each packet (DPI), block-
ing connections to known pools, analysing the memory consumption or installing
anti malware software. Nevertheless, these previous solutions may be quite expen-
sive in terms of resources and money. Additionally, they may require a significant
modification of the network or they may be inaccurate in several cases. For this rea-
son, in this project I suggest three differentmachine learning algorithms, where each
one explores a specific feature of this kind of malware in order to detect it. The first
one uses flowmeasurements, the second one uses the DNS queries to detect connec-
tions to pools, and the last one uses again the DNS queries but in order to detect
connections to malicious domains that may download miners. The combination of
these three algorithms provides a very reliable and efficient system to detect which
hosts on the network are mining.
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2 Introduction and contextualization
2.1 Context and problem formulation
The concept of distributed electronic cash system appeared for the first time in 1998,
when Wei Dai published a description of his "b-money" system, but it was not until
2009 that the first decentralised cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, emerged [1]. Bitcoin, created
by Satoshi Nakamoto, was only possible thanks to the development of the Blockchain
technology, which was introduced along with Bitcoin in the same paper [2]. This tech-
nology have become specially relevant in recent years for two reasons: first because
it is the base of most of the cryptocurrencies, and second because it is used for other
important systems such as Smart contracts [3].
2.1.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is just a distributed database of records, or in otherwords, a public ledger
of all transactions that have taken place among participating parties. Each time that a
transaction is executed, it has to be verified by consensus of a majority of the partici-
pants. If it is correctly verified, it is entered into the system and can never be removed,
since Blockchain keeps the information of every transaction ever performed [4].
The intrinsic structure of Blockchain defines its characteristics. In Figure 1 the basic
structure of Blockchain appears, consisting of a sequence of blocks where each block
maintains:
• Block Header: Metadata of the block such as a timestamp and the hashing number
of the block, i.e. the own identifier, which is the hash value of all the transactions
located in the block.
• TX: transactions data.
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• Parent Block Hash: the hashing number of the previous block, i.e. the identifier of
the previous block of the sequence.
• Transaction Counter: a transaction counter.
Figure 1: Structure of Blockchain
Source: [5]
The number of transactions that can be stored on each block depends on its size and
the size of each transaction [5]. Thus, new blocks have to be built from time to time in
a process known as mining.
In the mining process, the system asks some users, known as miners, to solve a very
complex mathematical problem, also know as Proof-of-Work (POW), needed to com-
plete and group all the new transactions in a new block, which is then linked to the
sequence. The first miner that finds the correct solution is rewarded, typically with an
amount of the mined cryptocurrency [6].
2.1.2 Illicit crypto mining
In Figure 2 we can observe how three of the most commonly used cryptocurrencies
have acquired a significant price in recent years, even though their value have decreased
lately compared with their peaks. The high value of cryptocurrencies, added to the
previously mentioned fact that only the first user who mines a block is rewarded, have
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transformed the mining process into a tough competition.
Figure 2: Evolution of cryptocurrency values
Source: Coinbase
Since Mining requires a noticeable number of computing resources, some miners
decide to collaborate and work together in what is called pools of miners, with the
aim of reaching higher levels of performance, splitting then the reward, if obtained,
between all the participating miners. A part from increasing their opportunities using
this method, somemalicious miners may decide to hijack resources from other users in
order to gather more computing power, so as to have an even bigger chance to be the
first ones to successfully mine a block without having to divide the reward [7]. This
action, which is known as illicit cryptomining or cryptojacking, is typically conducted
using one of these two methods:
• Browser-based cryptominingprograms: theminingprocess is executed in scripts
embedded in web content.
• Binary-based cryptomining malware: the mining process is embedded in the
payload of a malware running on an infected machine.
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The same attack pattern is perpetrated in both methods. The attacker infects hun-
dred of machines and use all of them to obtain a hash-rate, i.e. the speed of the miner’s
performance, that can reach similar levels than medium-sized mining farms [7].
Eachmethod has different characteristics. In browser-based cryptojacking, the dam-
age is easily avoidable, since the victim only needs to stop browsing the malicious site,
or otherwise restrict the use of JavasScript. Whereas cryptomining malware is harder
to detect and remove, since it involves classical malware features, like persistence and
obfuscation [7].
The problem arises when it comes to detect these cryptojacking activities, specially
the binary-based one (since it is normally obfuscated), and this is exactly the main pur-
pose of this project, the detection of cryptomining malware activity. The aim is to build
a system which, using different network indicators and measurements obtained from
reports of other applications, detects cryptomining activity. This system will consist of
three different machine learning systems based on three different features of crypto-
mining malware.
2.2 Stakeholders
As it was mentioned above, cryptocurrency mining requires considerable resources,
what means that a cryptomining malware will decrease significantly the performance
of infectedmachines, since themajority of resources are deflected to runmaliciousmin-
ing processes without the victim’s knowledge. For this reason, every end-user would
be interested in the system proposed in this project, since this huge use of resources
implies a significant energy consumption, which, consequently, decreases the life ex-
pectancy of these machines.
Therefore, the solution that seeks this project is particularly interesting for compa-
nies and, in particular, for the network administrators of these companies. In every
company is very important that machines reach an optimal performance, so a malware
decreasing it means less working capacity or, in other words, less production. This
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is specially significant for ICT companies, which base their economic activity on their
machines. In addition, a malware consuming a noticeable amount of energy is directly
translated into a considerable economic loss for the company. But the reasons do not
stop there, because if an administrator is even able to detect the infected hosts, it would
be easier to find the cause as well as the most appropriate solution while other works
can keep working.
Additionally, this project may be significantly helpful for the field of cybersecurity.
The number of cryptominingmalware have become one of the biggest threads in nowa-
days cybersecurity, so a reliable system that identifies this type of threads, as it is ex-
pected from this project to be, would suppose a substantial improvement in cybesecu-
rity against these threads, offering a huge help to decrease and stop the damage that
they may produce [8].
Finally, this project will be truly useful for me as a student and future professional.
Not only because it givesme an excellent opportunity to study andworkwith a contem-
porary problem, but because it offers me a unique way of approaching to an important
topic.
2.3 State of the art and justification of the selected alternative
There is not a standard method to perform the detection of cryptomining on net-
works. However, the detection of cryptomining activity is an important research topic
within networking and cybersecurity, hence many approaches can be found currently,
all of them with their benefits and drawbacks.
Some of the existing approaches analyse the code ofweb applications in order to find
instructions frequently present in mining algorithms [9]. Another approach consists in
analysing the memory consumption in web applications to compare it to the memory
used by known mining processes [10]. Both of these previous solutions require a big
effort due to their nature, so they are quite expensive in terms of resources, since they
demand a constant analysis of the instructions executed or the memory consumed.
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Additionally, there are many other studies that suggest the analysis of flows in or-
der to detect traffic anomalies that might indicate the presence of miners [11]. This
approach cares about performance, therefore it becomes a very feasible method, since
it does not need a huge amount of resources and, consequently, does not need to up-
grade or change the structure of the network. Nevertheless, using just the flowmay not
be enough, since the recognition of mining activity through flow is possible when the
Stratum protocol is used. This protocol is typically the one that is utilised when miners
want to connect to the pool, and due to its features, it is easy to recognise. However,
there are other mining protocols that may be used instead of Stratum, such as getblock-
template [12], so in these cases this method is not enough.
Currently there are many programs that try to detect cryptominingmalware. For in-
stance, the market is full of anti virus, such asAvast andMalwarebytes [13] [14], that will
detect existing cryptominingmalware located on themachine with high reliability [15].
There also exist some anti browser-based malware extensions for browsers, such as No
Coin and Anti Miner [16] [17]. Nevertheless, there are several drawbacks on all of these
already existing solutions:
• The user of the infected machine has to be aware that the machine might be com-
promised, and in order to do that, normally an exhaustive analysis of themachine
is required, meaning that resources will be taken for some time.
• The user of the infected machine has to install these programs or plugins and,
normally, they are not free, which is translated into an outlay that may not be
negligible, even more if we consider the case of a company, where each machine
have to install those programs.
Finally there are twomore traditional approaches, which are theDeep Packet Inspec-
tion (DPI) and the IP address filtering. When a DPI method is required, an exhaustive
inspection of each packet has to be performed, which means using a huge amount of
resources, what makes this solution an unfeasible one for medium/large networks. In
the second method, the network has to be altered so as to add a filter that avoids all the
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connections to IPs of known pools. Furthermore, miners connecting to unknown pools
will not be recognized, so this solution is not very convenient.
For all these previous reasons, it is sufficiently justified the idea behind this project, a
system that detects the activity of cryptomining malware without the need of individ-
ual analysis of each machine and several program licenses in case of companies. The
only requirement would be to gather information from the network in terms of flow
and DNS queries, something that an administrator could easily do.
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3 Scope of the project
3.1 Objectives of the project
Two main objectives motivate this project. The first one is to understand how cryp-
tomining malware works and how it concerns network’s traffic. The accomplishment
of this goal will be achieved by fulfilling a group of sub-objectives:
1. Understand how malware usually works.
2. Recognise the types of cryptomining malware.
3. Comprehend the characteristics of each type of cryptocurrency mining malware.
4. Know how network’s traffic usually is.
5. Collect several network measurements and traffic traces from infected networks.
6. Infer how each cryptomining malware alters network’s traffic.
There are twomain obstacles that may be found during the execution of this first ob-
jective. First of all, it may be hard to quickly and completely understand the features of
each type of cryptomining malware, since malware is constantly changing and evolv-
ing, which means that more time will be required to research and learn about it. A
part from that, it may be the case that the cryptomining malware alterations from the
captured network’s traffic are not easily distinguishable. If this happens, more mea-
surements will be collected until one of these two conclusions is reached: finally it is
possible to detect it with the new data, or it is not possible to detect it, so a more precise
inspection of the traffic is needed.
Once that the first objective, with its corresponding sub-objectives, has been com-
pleted, the second one is considered afterwards. This second objective is to develop all
of the threemachine learning algorithms. The first machine learning algorithm, named
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Pool Method, receives a list of the URLs that have appeared on DNS resolutions, and it
indicates if each URL is a pool or not. The second method, also known as Malicious
URL Method, receives a list of all URLs that were part of some DNS resolutions, and it
identify which of them might may be malicious. Finally, the last method called Flow
Method, receives network measurements and identify whether there are flows indicat-
ingmining activity. As before, the correct execution of this second objectivewill require
the achievement of some sub-objectives:
1. Combine the data collected in the first objectivewith already existing data in order
to create a good dataset for each method.
2. Build different models for each method and train all of them.
3. Test the accuracy of the consideredmodels and select the best one for eachmethod.
Only one potential obstacle may be found during the fulfillment of this objective,
which is that perhaps the collected data is not enough to correctly train the models.
This can be solved by collecting more data.
3.2 Potential obstacles and risks
During the development of this project, some obstacles are susceptible to arise. In
general terms, these are the potential ones:
• Timing: The time to work on the project is delimited, which means that only a
short amount of time can be dedicated to each task.
• Lack of awareness: Some concepts of this project, and therefore some technolo-
gies, are completely new to me. This translates into several hours of research and
lecture, what would possibly slow down my performance.
• Bad solutions: It is possible to find that some of themethods are not good enough
and they are unable to perform their task accurately. If that is the case, either a
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new approach will be suggested for the corresponding method or, if that is not
possible, the method will be discarded.
• Collection of data: An important step during the development of my project is
the collection of data for analysis and training purposes. This data may be hard
to gather.
3.3 Methodology and rigour
Thedevelopment of this projectwill follow the traditionalwaterfall procedure. Specif-
ically, the procedure has been planned in different stages:
1. Study previous cryptomining detection related works. This stage is specially im-
portant, because it will be necessary to understand how mining processes can be
identified from network measurements or traffic, as well as what tools are useful
and efficient for this purpose.
2. Study and understand how cryptomining malware works, focusing on what are
the similarities between them and which unique features they have.
3. Gather data, in form of traffic traces and network measurements, from networks
where cryptomining malwares are working, as well as clean networks, i.e. net-
works without cryptocurrency mining. Networks with both traffic of non mali-
cious applications and cryptomining processes are also considered.
4. Filter and analyse the data in order to extract conclusions about them. Basically
the intention behind this is to recognise patterns and common characteristics that
will help to determine when some measurements indicate that the network is
being used to mine cryptocurrencies.
5. From all the previous data and conclusions, prepare a dataset and combine it
with already existing datasets. Implement and train the three machine learning
algorithms mentioned previously in this document.
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6. Test the reliability of all the models previously built, and select and redefine the
best ones if needed.
7. Finally, extract conclusions and prepare the defense of the project.
3.3.1 Developing tools
As it has been mentioned above, before implementing the machine learning algo-
rithms it is needed to gather data from network. In order to do that we will rely first on
VirtualBox to create an infected host working on the network. This virtual machine will
be based on Windows 7. With the environment set, the collection of data will be done
usingNetFlowprotocol, which performs flow-levelmeasurements. To collect thesemea-
surements, nfcapd, softflowd and tcpdump will be used. Additionally, to capture traffic
traces from where DNS queries will be extracted, tcpdump as well as WireShark will be
needed.
Once that all a significant amount of measurements have been collected, the next
tool that will be used is Python in order to sanitise and analyse the data. Additionally,
the same language will be employed to implement the machine learning algorithms.
The reason of choosing Python was the fact that this language offers several modules
oriented to Machine Learning, which will facilitate the entire development process.
Another important reason for choosing Python is that it is widely used and accepted,
which means that many communities and forums will be available to consult. The
operating systems that will be utilised during the project are Ubuntu and Debian 9.
In addition to the above stated tools, Team Ganttwill be utilised to generate the Gantt
chart, and Github will be used to track the code and verify it each time that it changes.
Moreover, LibreOffice Impresswill also be employed so as to prepare the slides to defend
the final project.
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3.3.2 Monitoring tools
In order to ensure that all objectives are met, some monitoring processes will be
applied:
• Firstly, so as to ensure that the data has been correctly gathered, it will be sanitised
first before their use.
• Secondly, data will be analysed to check if the studied concepts about cryptomin-
ing malware correspond to the reality.
• Thirdly, to correctly categorise URLs as Malicious (for dataset corresponding to
Malicious URL Method), an URL will be considered as malicious if at least 10 en-
gines detect it as malicious in VirusTotal [18], or if there is at least one existing
report (hybrid or static analysis) indicating that it is malicious. The source for
this reports will be Hybrid Analysis [19] for hybrid analysis and Infosec [20] for
static analysis.
• Fourthly, to achieve a satisfactory level of prediction, the machine learning algo-
rithms will be trained using a large enough data. In addition, hyper-parameters
of machine learningmodels will be selected using an exhaustive grid search. This
will ensure that the best value for each hyper-parameter is selected.
• Finally, the machine learning algorithms will be tested to check if they reach a
good level of accuracy.
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4 Time planning
The project is expected to be elaborated in a four-moth period. It officially starts with
the beginning of GEP course and it approximately ends 4 months after that.
The academic load of this project corresponds to 18 ECTS credits. According to the
official regulations of the End of Degree project in FIB [21], each credit is estimated to
be 30 hours of work, which means that the total length of the project is equivalent to
540 hours.
This section focuses on the planning, organization and management of these previ-
ouslymentioned hours. In order to do that, these working hours are distributed among
all the required tasks. This schedule is expected to be followed, since it tries to be accu-
rate and realistic. However, it may suffer changes during the progression of the project
if it is necessary.
4.1 Description of tasks
The first step is to identify and describe all the tasks required to develop the project,
therefore this is what this section does. The resources needed for their fulfillment, the
estimated dedication in hours and the order of their execution are also explained here.
4.1.1 Project management tasks
Here are gathered all the tasks dedicated to themanagement. These tasks are crucial,
since they define and build the structure of the project.
Here we can find the tasks needed to be accomplished before any other else, i.e.
definition of the project’s scope, planning, budget and sustainability report.
In addition to the previous tasks, here are also located two more that have to be
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continuously performed. They are the documentation of the project, and the control
andmonitoringmeetings. These tasks are expected to be executed inmultiple occasions
during the development of the project.
The resources that will be used in order to complete these tasks are the software
Trello, which will be very helpful to manage and organise the execution of tasks, the
software Team Gantt to generate the Gantt chart for time planning, and LaTex, which
will be used to document the entire project. Regarding the human resources, a project
manager will be needed to work on these tasks.
4.1.2 Study of cryptomining malware
This project ismainly a research one, whichmeans that a significant amount of hours
have to be dedicated to study the fundamentals of cryptomining, as well as the current
existing malware to perform cryptojacking.
No special resources are needed here, seeing that this task only consists in research.
The only resource necessary is someonewho does that research, but this could perfectly
be the project manager.
4.1.3 Preparation of the environment
Once that the main cryptomining malware methods and tools have been completely
understood, the next step consists in gathering network traffic froman infected network.
In order to do that, first a controlled infected host has to be prepared under a network.
The infected host will be built using virtual machines with the support of VirtualBox
software, and infected with different samples of crytpomining malware. To ensure the
security, the free VPN windscribe will be used. Human resources are required now so
as to create the desired environment.
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4.1.4 Collection of data
With the environment correctly prepared, the network’s traffic and flow will be col-
lected. The aim is to analyse them in order to detect patterns and features that would
help in the subsequent recognition of this malware.
Traffic and flow will be collected several times in many different conditions, since
they will be helpful to have a big enough dataset. Human resources are needed in
order to collect this data using tcpdump and theNetFlow protocol. To do it, softflowdwill
be used as exporter, nfcapd will be used as collector, and tcpdump will be used to read
and extract data from the collected file.
4.1.5 Analysis of data
As mentioned above, this task focuses on analysing the captured traffic and flow
with the final intention of detecting patterns and features. This step also includes the
sanitation of data.
With this information and the studied one, the objective is to understand how mal-
ware can be detected, or in otherwords, where is the content that indicates the presence
of malware.
The resources required here are mainly three, someone who is able to analyse the
data, and Python and WireShark, which will be used to do it.
4.1.6 Build the machine learning methods
At this point, the penultimate step is just the development of three machine learning
algorithms able to identify if the presence of a cryptomining malware.
This step includes the creation of the required dataset, the selection of the most suit-
able model, the training of it, and the verification of the good reliability level of the
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system.
An engineer will be required here to develop the system. Additionally, the resources
that this person will use are GitHub, in order to track the code, and Python, which is the
programming language that the engineer will utilise to build the system.
4.1.7 Results and defense
This is the last task. This one is only dedicated to extract conclusions from all the
previous work and prepare the defense of the project.
The only tool required here is LibreOffice Impress, which will be used by the project
manager in order to prepare the slides for the defense.
4.2 Resources
Here is presented a list of all the resources that will be used during the development
of this project.
Regarding the hardware, the project will be elaborated using mainly an Asus PC
with the next relevant features: 16 GBRAM,GPUnVidia GeForce GTX 1050 4GBVideo
RAM, and a CPU Intel Core i7-7700HQ 2.80 GHz.
Regarding the software, many toolswill be used for different purposes, as it has been
stated in the previous section. In order to keep an updated list of uncompleted tasks
and tasks in progression, Trello will be employed. For documentation, the software
used will be LaTex, and Team Gantt just for the elaboration of the Gantt chart. For the
collection of data, VirtualBox with Windows 7 is the choosen software for the prepara-
tion of the environment, which will be installed on Debian 9 and and will be run while
using the VPN windscribe, and tcpdump along with NetFlow are the tools that will be
utilised to collect both traffic and flow, using for this last one softflowd as exporter and
nfcapd as collector. In addition, Pythonwill be the language used to define the machine
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learning program as well as to analyse the collected data, that it will be also done using
WireShark. Finally, LibreOffice Impresswill be the tool to prepare the project defense. The
development and execution of code as well as the analysis of data will be run using the
Ubuntu operating system.
4.3 Time planning
In Table 1 each task appears with its corresponding dedication time:
Task Estimated Time in hours
Project management tasks 150
Study of cryptomining malware 70
Preparation of the environment 80
Collection of data 25
Analysis of data 40
Build the machine learning system 130
Results and defense 45
Total 540

















4.4 Sequence of development: Gantt
Figure 3: Gantt chart
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4.5 Action plan and obstacles
As it can be observed in Figure 3, the intention is to keep documenting the project
beside the development itself of it. The same works for control and monitoring meet-
ings, which are expected to be taken every one or two weeks during all the project
development. Weekend days do not appear in order to simplify the chart, but they are
considered for the computing of total hours.
One of the potential obstacles previously noticed was the lack of time to complete a
task. If a task requires more hours than expected, next task dedication will be reduced
in the same way, so as to avoid lack of time to finish the project. Nevertheless, if a task
is completed before the expected ending time, the next one will start immediately.
The lack of awareness was another potential problem, since many hours will be ded-
icated to the research. In case of needingmore time to study some of the essential topics
for the project, more hours will be dedicated to the project, increasing the total work-
load.
Regarding data, a few obstacles may be reached. The first one is that the collected
data is not enough to extract conclusions about the alterations of cryptocurrencymining
malware on the network’s traffic. If this happens, more data will be collected until it
is possible to do it, or in case it is not, a more precise inspection of traffic will be used.
This is translated into inspecting each packet more accurately. The other obstacle may
be the need of more data in order to train the machine learning methods. In this case
the solution only consists in the collection of more data.
Finally, in a previous section it was mentioned that it is possible to not reach a good
accuracy for some of the models. If this happens, either an alternative approach will be
studied, or if this is not possible, the model will be discarded if the other ones are still
functional with good accuracy.
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5 Budget
Once that the objectives and the development planning have been clearly defined, a
new decisive stage immediately emerges, which is the analysis of the budget. The aim
of this section is to study this crucial aspect of project management, obviously applied
to this specific project.
In this section the costs are firstly identified, and secondly estimated.
5.1 Hardware
Here are considered all the costs related to the hardware used during the devel-
opment of the project. As it was previously mentioned, only one PC will be utilised,
and its characteristics were already specified. Additionally, one peripheral, an external
mouse, will be needed, but since it is not expensive and it will be used exclusively with
the PC, its price will be included in the total cost of the PC.
Table 2 contains the cost of each hardware element as well as the total cost of hard-
ware, which is the same in the case of this project. The amortization is expressed
monthly, since it is computed considering that the TFG is developed in a four-moth
period.
Component Cost Lifetime Amortization
PC 1,050 € 8 years 43.75 €
Total 1,050 € 43.75 €
Table 2: Hardware costs
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5.2 Software
Working with different software may mean a serious outlay. Owing to this fact, it is
helpful to analyse their cost, which is exactly what Table 3 does by enumerating all of
them and specifying their cost, in conjunctionwith computing the total cost of software.
However, as it can be noticed, all the software managed in this project is free, which is
translated into a null software outlay.
As a clarification, the Windows 7 that will be used with Virtual Box is an already
prepared machine distributed for free byMicrosoft [22].
Software Cost Lifetime Amortization
Ubuntu 18 0 € 4 years 0 €
Debian 9 0 € 4 years 0 €
Python 0 € 4 years 0 €
Trello 0 € 4 years 0 €
LaTex 0 € 4 years 0 €
Team Gantt 0 € 4 years 0 €
LibreOffice Impress 0 € 4 years 0 €
VirtualBox 0 € 4 years 0 €
Windows 7 machine 0 € 4 years 0 €
windscribe VPN 0 € 4 years 0 €
NetFlow 0 € 4 years 0 €
nfcapd 0 € 4 years 0 €
softflowd 0 € 4 years 0 €
WireShark 0 € 4 years 0 €
tcpdump 0 € 4 years 0 €
Total 0 € 0 €
Table 3: Software costs
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5.3 Human resources
First of all, the human resources required are identified in Table 4, indicating the cost
of each one along with the total cost of human resources. Afterwards, the work of each
of them is detailed and situated in some of the tasks mentioned previously.
Positions Price per hour Total working time Total cost
Project Manager 68 € 195 13,260 €
Systems administrator 14 € 150 2,100 €
Data scientist 18 € 65 1,170 €
Machine learning engineer 18 € 130 2,340 €
Total 540 18,870 €
Table 4: Human resources costs
Project manager is probably the most important position in this project. The project
manager, as it can be observed, assumes the biggest workload, working on the project
management tasks and the definition of results and preparation of the defense. Addi-
tionally, the price per hour of this position is quite high, according to the average salary
in Spain [23]. For all the previous reasons, a majority portion of the budget for human
resources is destined to pay this position.
A Systems administrator is required in order to study the cryptomining malware so
as to prepare the environment where the network measurements will be collected. In
other words, the systems administrator will work on the two tasks oriented to prepare
the environment for the data collection. This is translated into 150 hours of work, which
will be remunerated with 2,100 €, 14 € per hour, the average salary per hour in Spain
for this position [24].
Finally, two more roles are needed, a data scientist and a machine learning engineer.
Their responsibilities are very well defined, the first one has to collect the data and
analyse it, while the second one has to prepare a machine learning software able to
Detection of cryptocurrency mining malware from network measurements page 32
perform the expected classificationwith a good reliability. Their corresponding salaries
are 18 € for both of them, the average national salary in both cases [25][26].
To summarise the above mentioned work dedication per position, in Table 5 each
role is attached to the task/s that each role will need to work on, indicating the number
of hours that will be required, i.e. the estimated duration of the task. In addition, the
total estimated cost per task is shown. The tasks are the previously identified on Gantt
chart.
Dedication time in hours
Cost
Project Manager Systems administrator Data scientist Machine learning engineer
Project management tasks 150 10,200 €
Study of cryptomining malware 70 980 €
Preparation of the environment 80 1,120 €
Collection of data 25 450 €
Analysis of data 40 720 €
Build the machine learning system 130 2,340 €
Results and defense 45 3,060 €
Table 5: Positions attached to their tasks and total cost per task
5.4 Total budget
In the previous subsections the main costs that have to be considered in every com-
puter science project were analysed. Other costs considered negligible, such as trans-
port, have not been included.
Here all these previous costs are added in order to obtain a global and simplified
vision of the total budget required. Table 6 expresses this concept.
5.5 Incidents, contingencies and management control
During the development of this project there exists the possibility of facing some
obstacles, which means that the original budget may suffer variations.






Table 6: Total costs
It was mentioned that a possible problem is the modification of the expected time
dedicated to work on some of the tasks. If this occurs, the budget destined to human
resourceswill vary according to the corresponding timemodification, i.e. ifmore time is
required to complete a task its correspondingworkerwill receive an extra remuneration
proportional to the number of extra hours dedicated, and the sameworks the other way
around.
Regarding the hardware costs, the unique possible problem is the damage to the PC
used for the development of the project. In that case, the budget for hardware will in-
crease in order to pay the repair or the acquisition of a newmachine. Theworst situation
would be the need to acquire new hardware, which will translate into an approximate
increment of 1,050 €, the price of the currently used hardware.
Software costs are hardly sensitive to increase, since the software needed is free and
widely used, whichmeans that the necessity to find an alternative is highly improbable,
but even in that case, several free alternatives exist anyway.
Consequently it seems that the original budget will not suffer huge modifications,
so the final budget will remain close to the original one.
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6 Sustainability and social commitment
Sustainability in project management is also essential, specially for technological
projects where the impact on the ecosystem may be significant. In addition, a smart
use of our finite resources is certainly needed in order to not waste them. For these
reasons, this section tries to clarify these topics in the context of this project.
In order to analyse the sustainability of this project, it will be detailed on three dif-
ferent areas: economical, social and environmental. Furthermore, a conclusion of the
self evaluation survey is also included.
6.1 Social sustainability
6.1.1 Project put into production (PPP)
First of all, I feel like this project will be extremely beneficial for my personal growth.
First of all, because it will give me an excellent opportunity to experience and learn
how to handle a medium/big project, providing me tools that I may use in a future.
Moreover, this project will offer me the possibility of approaching to a very appealing
topic to me.
Additionally, the opportunity to work on a project within the field of cybersecurity
have brought some reflections to my mind. These reflections are related to the ethics
behind the exploitation and subsequent damage of the property of other people for
profit. However, the ones that are making profit from other users’ damage are not only
the attackers, but also the distributors of anti malware software, since the majority of
them are selling their products at a very high price. For this reason, I think that users
should have the possibility to protect themselves against threads like the ones studied
in this project.
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6.1.2 Lifetime
This project has a significant social impact, since it offers a solution to an existing
problematic that affects thousands of PC users all over the world. Actually this is what
justifies this project, the real need of a solution in order to stop an illicit activity that
damages a noticeable number of machines.
Currently this above mentioned problem is solved using anti malware software,
which is normally quite expensive, that has to be installed on every computer of the
network. This is translated into a serious outlay, not only for companies but also for in-
dividuals. Here appears the social impact that it was introduced earlier in this section,
this project offers a solution that is cheap, that only requires to be installed on one ma-
chine of the network, and that it will help to avoid serious damages on other computers
of the network. This is the improvement of social dimension of this project with respect
the other existing solutions, and at the same time, another justification for its need.
As it has been stated before, themain beneficiaries of this project are both the regular
computer users and the companies, specifically the network administrators, who are the
ones in charge of security and the properworking of the networks inside the companies.
On the contrary, themain affected parties are basically the attackers using these kind
of attacks, since this project offers a countermeasure, and anti malware distributors,
since this project can be seen as an alternative product. Regarding the first group, they
will probably need to upgrade their techniques to ensure avoiding the detection. About
the second collective, it is true that this project presents a cheap an reliable alternative
to expensive anti malware, however, the anti malware distributors will not be really
affected, due to the fact that this project only focuses on one specific type of thread,
whereas anti malware software normally offer protection against many others, so ama-
jority of users interested in full protection will still purchase their products.
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6.1.3 Risks
This project will be mainly detrimental for cybercriminals. Nevertheless, there ex-
ists a risky scenario where this project can be harmful for the main beneficiaries of it.
This scenario happens when the attacks change and new techniques are applied (for
example using non common protocols or when the use of proxies or private pools is
generalised). In that case, the solution proposed in this project would start failing and
consequently, would stop offering an accurate detection. Consequently, administrators
and users trusting this solution to detect attackers will be vulnerable.
There is no other possible risk associated to this project, since there are not more
dangerous scenarios. Additionally, the dependency of users to this solution is not ex-
cessive, since there are still other alternatives.
6.1.4 Conclusion
The evaluation of this project in this field is an 8, because it has a considerable impact
on society and it really improves the existing solutions so as to avoid a serious problem.
Furthermore, the risks are few and there are not many affected groups in a negative
sense.
6.2 Economical sustainability
6.2.1 Project put into production (PPP)
In previous sections the total estimated budgetwas examined, splitting it into budget
for human resources, for software and for hardware. This estimation tries to be themost
accurate possible, even considering potential deviations and contingencies.
The cost foreseen tries to be the lowest possible, since the only cost considered is the
one related to hardware and human resources, and both are completely necessary. In
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order to achieve that, only free software was considered, since it can be quite expensive
otherwise. For instance, just deciding to use Linux instead ofWindows there is a saving
of 145 € (price of the cheapest version of Windows 10 [27]). In addition, the cost related
to human resources is also the smallest one, since each worker only works the strictly
needed amount of time.
This systemwould be very helpful and necessary for companies, universities and, in
general, for every network accessed by multiple users. This added to the benefits that
it offers to users with respect to the other existing solution, will permit to establish a
good selling price to cover all the costs and even earn profit. This system will be sold
to companies or individuals using an annual license.
6.2.2 Lifetime
The solution introduced in this project will economically improve the other existing
solution in the sense that it only focuses on this type of malware, meaning that there
will not be the need to spend as money as the other solution spends in studying and
analysing all new malware. This will also give the opportunity to sell the system for a
lower price than the other solutions, since less costs have to be covered. This is specially
important during the lifetime, since the upgrade will be less expensive.
Nevertheless, there will be some cost related to the maintenance of this solution,
since the threads are constantly evolving and cryptomining attacks constantly evolve.
For that reason, human resources will be required to keep updating the detector, which
means a constant outlay. In particular, a project manager and an engineer are the
needed profiles, which suppose, as it was seen before, a cost of 18 € per hour to pay the
machine learning engineer, along with the 68 € per hour normally paid to the project
manager.
Another important cost that may be considered is the renovation of the hardware,
which has to be replaced at the end of its lifetime or in case that it breaks. However, if
it is possible to repair it and it is cheaper than updating it, this option has to be contem-
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plated.
6.2.3 Risks
Despite the good economical viability of this project, there is an important risky case
that might compromise the project. This hypothetical situation would happen if the
value of cryptocurrencies drops to the level that makes mining no longer profitable.
Since attacker needs some investment in order to produce and distribute malware, if
this process stops being profitable, nomore resources will be assigned for this purpose,
so this kind of attacks will stop. If that is the case, a detector will become useless.
6.2.4 Conclusion
This project is evaluated with a 6 in this field. Costs are minimum and necessary.
However, there are some alternatives offeringprotection and/or detection tomore threads
than this project. In addition, there also exists an important scenario that might ruin
the entire project, despite being very unlikely to happen.
6.3 Environmental sustainability
6.3.1 Project put into production
This project does not require any special resource, since it is mainly a research one
with an implementation of threemachine learning algorithms. This means that regard-
ing environmental sustainability, the only resources used are the electricity consumed
by the PC, which can be estimated at 230W [28], and the paper required to print some
information.
In order to avoid the excessive electricity consumption, which production releases
huge emissions of CO2, a possible solution would be the reduction of PC usage, mean-
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ing that the expected time dedicated to the study of cryptomining malware would be
reduced in a significant way. Themajor drawback in that casewould be a lack of knowl-
edge. Another way to reduce the use of resources, which has been applied, is the sub-
stitution of printed paper for electronic documents.
6.3.2 Lifetime
The resources that will be needed during the lifetime of the project is just a PC, since
nothing else is expected to be used. This means that the environmental impact regard-
ing the updating and maintenance of the project is just the production of the electricity
required for this PC. Since the PC utilised will be the same than the one used during
the project put into production, the consumption will remain approximately around
230W.
This project indirectly allows the reduction of some resources. Specifically, the elec-
tricity consumption might be reduced, thanks to the fact that if cryptomining malware
is detected thanks to this project, the power consumption of the victim’smachinewill be
reduced once the miner is removed, so the CPU usage will be restored again to normal
values. For this reason, the project can be considered as positive for the reduction of the
environmental foot print, since the resources are few and the probability of reducing
the power consumption of some machines quite high.
6.3.3 Risks
There is a scenario where the environmental foot print might increase. This is the
case where the project is working but not detecting any miner. In this case, the works
of updating and maintenance of the project would be still ongoing, i.e. consuming
electricity, but not at the same time the project would not be helping to reduce the usage
of any other resource as mentioned before.
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6.3.4 Conclusion
This project receives an 8 in this area, since there are only a few necessary resources,
of which only one was finally required (electricity).
6.4 Matrix of sustainability
The scores assigned to each dimension of sustainability are summarised in Table 7.
Social Economical Environmental
Score 8 6 8
Table 7: Matrix with the corresponding score for each dimension
With the previous analysis, it seems a very balanced project in terms of sustainability.
This is due to the small number of resources required to develop the project as well as
the significant impact that it has, not only on society by helping users and companies
to protect themselves against miners, but also on the environment by helping with the
reduction of power consumption.
6.5 Conclusions of the self evaluation
After completing the survey about my domain of sustainability, I have realised that
my general knowledge of managing a project caring about sustainability is quite weak.
I have realised that I have no problem solving IT related problems and managing a big
project, defining its budget and, in general, its features, but when it comes to analyse
the impact of that project in the economy, the environment and the society, I findmyself
with troubles to completely understand it.
I think that this is due to the fact that during my degree, the courses were always
focused on the development of projects, just evaluating if each projectwas correctly sug-
gested and implemented. There was never a real need of analysing the sustainability
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behind those projects. Sustainability was only emphasised on some of the “Competèn-
cies Transversals”, where I feel that I learned a majority part of what I know now about
that topic.
A part from learning about sustainability in the previous mentioned way, the devel-
opment of this document has also pushed me to study more about this topic. In other
words, I can say that what I know now about the topic only comes from this research
for this third document and these “Competències Transversals”.
For this reason, I feel like I still have a lot to learn. For example I know nothing
about the deontological ethics that are mentioned in the survey, so I do not know how
to boost an IT project with coherence in an economical, social and environmental sense.
Consequently, I would suggest to include more actively this topic on FIB courses, in
order to correctly form the students so they can work considering the sustainability.
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7 Data overview
7.1 Justification of the required data
As it was previouslymentioned, the idea is to develop three different machine learn-
ing algorithms, each one of them will focus on a specific feature of cryptomining mal-
ware. These features are: connections to mining pools, connections to malicious URLs,
and network flow.
The connections to mining pools is a very specific and helpful feature for the de-
tection of miners, since every mining process has to connect to some pool. However,
this is not enough, as some miners may connect to private unknown pools or through
proxies. In fact, this last technique is quite common in modern attacks, due to the fact
that some pools block users when they are using botnets, i.e. a net of infected machines
mining for one user, so instead of generating hundreds of hash-rates for one user, with
proxies the attacker can send just one hash-rate to the pool, avoiding the detection of
botnet usage [7].
Another important characteristic is the connection to malicious URLs. This is inter-
esting because some cryptomining malware is distributed using other malware, which
is calledDroppers. Droppers connect to malicious URLs in order to download other mal-
ware such as cryptomining malware or spyware [29]. For this reason, it is interesting
to identify these cases to detect miners. Nevertheless, in some cases it is not easy to
detect whether an URL is malicious or not without inspecting its content, so even with
a machine learning method with high accuracy, some URLs may be ignored.
Finally, the network flow is the last important characteristic that we want to con-
sider. A majority of the pools use Stratum protocol in order to communicate with min-
ers. This protocol, which is implemented over TCP, consists of two sets of methods,
one from client to server, and the other from server to client, and all of these methods
use JSON [30]. Additionally, Stratum connections are characterised by the fact that the
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server usually transmits data constantly whereas the client transmits few data, which
makes this type of connections easy to recognise. Despite this protocol is the most
commonly used nowadays, there are some other possible miner-pools protocols which
differ in a significant way, and this is the major drawback of this method of detection,
it only works for Stratum or other JSON related protocols with similar patterns.
After noticing all the above stated drawbacks and benefits, the conclusion is that the
best option is to gather and apply all of the three methods on the same system. This
will increment the probabilities to detect miners even in case that one or two methods
fail. For this reason, we need the data required for all the three methods, in order to
analyse it, so as to guarantee that it is possible to detect patterns and behaviours that
will help to identify miners, and to prepare the required datasets.
7.2 Required data
In the previous section, it was identified that the data required consists of URLs and
network flows. Regarding the first group, URLs, the best alternative is to check theDNS
queries, since this is the most efficient way to check which connections are tried by each
host. An alternative to identify the URLs would be to collect all the traffic and identify
and inspect the HTTP messages, but this will require a deep inspection of each packet,
which is translated into a more expensive solution. In contrast, in order to check the
DNS queries, the only file required is a dnstop file containing all the DNS resolutions.
This is something an administrator can easily obtain.
Regarding the network flow, Jordi Zayuela’s paper [6] will be really helpful for this
task, since it will be used as a reference for this method. Netflow version 5 would be the
chosen solution to gather it. Netflow is a protocol developed by CISCO that analyses the
network traffic. This protocol joins all packets with common features. In other words,
all packets sharing the same source and destination IP address, the same source and
destination port, the same protocol, the same ingress interface and the same IP type of
service are gathered into an unidirectional single flow [31].
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The version of Netflow used in this project allows to export several fields of infor-
mation, however, due to the fact that the main feature that would possibly allow the
detection of Stratum protocol is related to the quantity of information transmitted, we
are only interested on those fields containing information about quantity of data, as
well as host address which will be useful for the identification of the mining host. Ad-
ditionally, since Stratum does not use any specific port by default, information about





• Number of bytes
• Number of packets
As it was stated before, the quantity of data transmitted is usually quite low. For this
reason, we will use bits instead of using bytes. Additionally,the purpose of exporting
the duration of the flow will be to compute metrics that do not depend on the duration
of the flow. In other words, we can not compare the total number of bits and packets
between different flows if their duration is completely different, so for that reason, the
best solution is to use bits per second and packets per second instead, and that is why
we need the duration of each flow.
The previous information will only be exported for flows using TCP. In addition, in
order to complement this information so as to facilitate the detection of mining activity,
each flow will be aggregated to its complementary, so instead of having two different
flows for a connection between server and client (sinceNetflow is unidirectional), wewill
only have one with both flows together and two directions, inbound and outbound.
To summarise, the final metrics that we will use to determine if a flow contains Stra-
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• (Inbound Packets)/(Outbound Packets)
• (Inbound bits)/(Outbound bits)
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8 Data collection
Once that we know which information we want to capture, the next step is the col-
lection of this information.
Before starting with the capture of DNS resolutions and network flows, first of all we
have to determine from where we will capture. For that reason, I decided to prepare
a virtual machine that will be infected with different samples of malware in order to
gather traffic traces and flows. The idea behind this action is to observe how crypto-
mining malware behaves in real simulated scenarios as well as collecting data for the
following analysis and creation of datasets.
8.1 Creation of the environment
Therefore, the first step is the creation of the environment. As it was stated above, I
will use a virtual machine, concretely, Virtual Box with a Windows 7 operating system.
All this software will be installed on a new partition with Debian 9.
When testing and studying malware, a crucial aspect is the security of the computer
and the network. This consideration is specially important during this stage of the
project, hence multiple protection mechanisms were prepared. First of all, the virtual
machine is isolated from the real machine and the network by setting the following
configurations:
• The type of network established in the virtual machine is NAT, so no one on the
network can notice the virtual machine except for the real machine where is lo-
cated (this works as a gateway for the virtual machine).
• Folding sharing and clipboard sharing are disabled. USB is also disabled on the
virtual machine.
• The VPN windscribe is used. This avoids that the attacker knows my IP address
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or my network, evading future possible attacks.
Once all these previous mechanisms are correctly set, the defenses of the virtual
machine such as the firewall or windows defender are disabled, in order to facilitate
the infection.
8.2 Obtention of malware samples
After correctly setting the environment, the next stage consists in obtainingmalware
samples that will be utilised to infect the virtual machine. The needed malware is only
the relatedwith cryptomining, that is cryptominingmalware or droppers downloading
cryptomining malware.
The main source for finding these samples was URLhaus [32], a big database con-
taining many online malware samples from different types.
A total of 30 samples were obtained here. Nevertheless, before proceeding with the
infection, those samples were examined. In order to correctly classify the samples as
malware and, specifically, as cryptomining related malware, two filters were applied:
1. Malware: A sample is considered malware if at least 10 AV engines in VirusTotal
label it as malware, or if there exists at least one report (hybrid analysis or static
analysis) stating that it is indeed malware.
2. Cryptomining related malware: A sample is considered to be related to crypto-
mining if at least 10 AV engines inVirusTotal label it as CoinMiner or some variant,
or if there exists at least one report (hybrid or static analysis) stating that is is a
miner or a dropper downloading a miner process.
After applying this filter to the collected samples, a total of 20 sampleswere left. This
samples will be used to collect the required data.
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8.3 Gathering of data
With the previous environment and malware samples, the virtual machine was in-
fected. The procedure consisted of a set of steps applied for each sample:
1. Recover to a previous state where the virtual machine was not infected.
2. Infect the virtual machine with a single sample.
3. Collect traffic for 10 minutes in form of pcap files using tcpdump.
4. Generate nfcapd files from the previous pcap file using nfcapd and softflowd.
5. Generate a csv file from reading the previous nfcapd using tcpdump. This file
contains all the previously presented metrics obtained from Netflow.
From repeating the previous cycle for each sample, a pcap file and a csv file contain-
ing the Netflow metrics are obtained for each sample.
It is important to clarify that the pcap file will be the equivalent to the dnstop file,
since the pcap file was also required for the analysis as well as for the generation of
flow. For that reson, for the generation of the dataset the pcap will work as a dnstop file
due to the fact that only the DNS resolutions will be considered.
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9 Data analysis
In the previous section, the data was correctly obtained. The main purpose of this
previous data was to analyse it and detect patterns and check behaviours.
For this reason, the first behaviour that I checked was the connection to the POOLs.
As it was stated previously, one of the reasons for checking DNS resolutions was to
check if theURLs involvedwere related tomining pools, since everymining process has
to connect to somepool. In figure 4 it can be seen aDNS resolution to aminer poolmade
by a cryptominingmalware, followed by a TCP connection to that pool. This proves that
the behaviour was the one expected. After infecting the machine, the mining process
starts a new communication with the pool using a standard DNS resolution.
Figure 4: Trace of traffic created by malware
The previous pattern was followed by a majority of the samples. However, there
were cases particularly interesting, where the connections to the pools were not so evi-
dent. In those cases, the connectionsweremade through proxies. For instance, in figure
5 is display one of these unusual cases, where the mining process was possibly made
through onion network.
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Figure 5: Possible DNS traffic of a mining program through onion network
The identification of these previous unusual cases strengthen the idea suggested in
this project, just relying on only one feature for the detection of cryptomining malware
is not a good idea, since in many cases it can fail.
The next analysis consisted in checking how cryptomining malware works when is
distributed through other malware. That is checking the behaviour of droppers down-
loading miners. Figure 6 shows clearly the traffic generated by a dropper. As it can
be noticed, the dropper tries to connect to several malicious URLs in order to keep
downloading malware. Finally, one of the last connections is the one made to the pool
moneroocean, consequence of a miner downloaded by the dropper.
Figure 6: Example of DNS traffic generated by a dropper
This previous analysis indicates that droppers can be used for the final purpose of
mining. Hence, the suggested URL method would be very useful to detect the connec-
tion to malicios URLs that may download miners.
Finally, the last analysis to be done was the one regarding the flow. In order to com-
pletely understand the patterns that the flow follows, before starting with its analysis,
the first step was to gather more flows. For that reason and due to the fact that no more
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samples of coinminers were available on the data base, the flows proceeding from pub-
lic data sets were aggregated to the flows extracted from the samples. Those datasets
consistedmainly of pcap files containing bothmalware and non-malware activity, from
which the flows were extracted using the same tools than the ones used with the pcaps
files obtained during the capture of data.
The previous datasets were obtained from Stratosphere Research Laboratory [33], and
they have been used in several papers [34] [35] as well as in some conferences [36].
Concretely, the external files obtained were 2018-02-23_win13, 2018-03-27_win4, 2018-
04-04_win16,2013-12-17_capture1, 2017_04_30_normal, 2017-04-18_win-normal, 2017-04-
19_win-normal, 2017-04-25_win-normal, 2017-04-28_normal, 2017-05-01_normal, 2017-05-
02_normal, 2017-07-03_capture_win2. Some of these files contain malware activity, oth-
ers contain non-malware traffic. The usage of these data sets will be helpful in order to
have non-malware traffic so as to correctly identify patterns.
Once that a total dataset of flow metrics is created, each flow is labeled with yes or
no, indicating if the flow is using Stratum or not. In order to correctly classify each
flow, a deep packet inspection is performed, since the pcap files are available. If the
content of each flow shows a JSONmethod containing information about mining, then
the flow is labeled as yes. From this point, the process continued by checking that the
traffic can be correctly identified. The most important feature was the low quantity of
information transmitted along with the fact that the client sends very small quantity of
data whereas the server sends the data in a steady way. In order to check the existing
patters, three plots were created. Every plot shows the flows from Stratum connections
(the ones in black) and from non Stratum, i.e. non mining, connection. In the first one,
Figure 7, we can see the behaviour of the inbound and outbound bits per second. As it
was predicted, the number of bits per second sent by the client on a Statrum connection
(BitsOut) is very small, while the number of bits per second received by the client is
bigger (for the above stated reason that the server is sending constantly), but is still
small compare with normal traffic.
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Figure 7: Patterns of inbound and outbound bits per second
In Figure 8, the same conclusions are obtained here. Server sends more packets per
second than the client, even though the difference is less significant than in the case
of bits. However, still the quantity of data transmitted (in this case packets) in mining
connections is still much smaller than in case of other traffic.
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Figure 8: Patterns of inbound and outbound packets per second
In the case of Figure 9, the identification is not as clear as in the other cases. Here
the quantity of bits per packet transmitted by the client and the server in non mining
connections can be very reduced too in some cases. However, the mining flows are
grouped in a very specific area, quite separated from non Stratum traffic. Still the num-
ber of outbound bits per second is bigger than the inbound, due to the fact that the
quantity of bits transmitted is much bigger in case of the server, while the number of
packets sent in both cases only differs slightly.
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Figure 9: Patterns of inbound and outbound bits per packet
From the previous analysis, the conclusion is clear, there are patterns that can be
distinguished by a machine learning algorithm in order to classify flows into mining
related flows or non mining related flows. However, as it was already stated, these
patterns are only seen in cases of Stratum or related protocol. If the connection protocol
shows different patterns regarding the quantity of transmitted data, then a new analysis
would be required in order to check possible patterns.
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10 Machine Learning algorithms
In this section, the development of the machine learning algorithms as well as the
creation of their required datasets are explained. Furthermore, a comparison between
the different models to consider for each method is shown.
10.1 Datasets
From the previous section, one of the datasets is already set, which is the dataset
with netflow metrics. This dataset is already built. In table 8 the total number of flows
can be observed. Although is not a big data set, I consider that it will be enough to train





Table 8: Number of flows labeled as mining (yes) and non mining
Regarding the dataset containing the URLs for the Malicious URL method, the first
part of the creation of this dataset consisted in gathering all the URLs from the DNS
resolutions in the samples and external pcap files obtained from public repository. Af-
terwards, thisURLs are filteredusing the parameters presented before. That is checking
that at least 10 AV inVirus Total detect it asmalicious, or if there exists at least one report
stating that the URL is malicious.
The second part of the dataset construction consisted in joining aggregating data to
the previous data. This was done by obtaining public lists of Phishing URLs [37], lists
of URLs dedicated to SPAM [38], URLs with malware [39], and finally clean URLs [40].
Finally, from all the previous data, we have now a dataset with either a label "bad"
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meaning that the URL is malicious, or "good" if the URL is considered benign. In table





Table 9: Number of malicious and benign URLs
Finally, regarding the dataset for the Pool method, all the URLs involved in a DNS
resolution in some of the pcap files obtained from the malware samples (and from the
public repository of datasets) are checked with a list of all the current living pools [41].
If the selected URL is a pool, it is labeled with a 1 (indicating that it is a pool indeed),
otherwise is labeled with a 0. At the end of the process, all the pools from the list of
living pools that have not appeared yet are introduced into the dataset. The other non
pool relatedURLs are obtained from the data set of theMalicious URLmethod. Of course
these URLs are not from pools, so they are labeled as 0. In table 9 it can be noticed both





Table 10: Number of URLs from mining pools and from non mining pools
10.2 Malicious URL Method
With the dataset prepared, the next step is to develop a machine learning algorithm
which receives an URL and determines whether is malicious or not. The quickest way
to do is is just by inspecting the URL, without executing any code from the URL, so the
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prediction should be done just using the lexical information appearing in the URL. In
other words, the idea is to apply a static analysis.
In order to do the above stated task, one way (and the one explored in this project)
is to split each URL into parts also known as features. For instance, from the URL
cassiope.cz/js/bin.exe we can obtain the following vector of features: cassiope, cz, js, bin,
exe.
Now,we can apply the same idea to all themaliciousURLs, sowewill have a vector of
vectors of features. We can now combine all of them, sincewewant to avoid repetitions,
generating a vector of features. So now we have several URLs, where the total of URLs
is denoted by U in order to formalise the problem, and a vector of features or words,
where the total of words is identified byW .
The term frequency, which is the number of occurrences of a word inside an URL,
can be denoted by TF (u,w) = fu, w, where u ∈ U , w ∈ W , and fu, w is just the num-
ber of occurrences of word w in URL u. This idea is useful to extract a more abstract
concept, which is to know how strange or common is a word in all the entire set of
malicious URLs (the same will be then applied for benign URLs). Inverse Document
Frequency (IDF) is perfect for this purpose. The IDF is computed by: IDF (w,U) =
log
|U |
|{u ∈ U : t ∈ u}|
If we apply the previous value to every word in the vector of features extracted from
the list of malicious URLs, finally wewell have how rare and common is each word. If a
word has a small IDF, it means that this word is quite common among malicious. How
much bigger the value, much rare is the word.
However, we cannot use that to fit our model yet, since the differences between com-
mon and rare words are not very significant, or at least not enough to ensure a good
classification. We should guarantee that common cases are filtered, so for that reason
I applied weights. Term frequency-Inverse document frequency (TFIDF) perfectly de-
fines this: TFIDF (w, u, U) = TF (w, u) ∗ IDF (w,U).
Detection of cryptocurrency mining malware from network measurements page 60
In the TFIDF we will get higher scores in case of common words in the given URL
but rare through the set of URLs. Now this scores work well to train the models.
Themain idea is, from just an URL, which is a set of characters containing first a pro-
tocol, and then a resource, extract statistical features so a machine learning algorithm
can be fitted. The features must be based on lexical features, since I want to apply the
idea of the static analysis of malware to the URLs, so no access or execution has to be
done.
So finally, the entire formalisation of the problem is shown afterwards. Given a
dataset {(u1, y1), ..., (un, yn)} where U = {u1, ..., un}, n ≥ 2, yi ∈ {good, bad} and 1 ≤
i ≥ n.
1. Extract features: ui → xi where xi ∈ Rd, being this a d-dimensional feature vector.
∀v ∈ xi, TFIDF (v, ui, U) = zi. In other words, zi is the TFIDF score of a feature
inside the vector of features obtained from the url ui.
2. Predict: ∀z apply g : Rd → {good, bad}
With the solution proposed, now it is time to apply the algorithm and train different
models in order to realise which model obtains the best results. Due to the big size of
the the dataset, only twomethodswere feasible enough to use: Multinomial Naive Bayes,
Logistic Regression.
• Multinomial Naive Bayes: This model works well for huge datasets due to the
fact that is very simple to construct. The main idea is to use the dataset in order
to create a score, in a way that greater scores are associated with one class, and
smaller scores are associated with the other, so basically the idea is to compare
a score with this threshold. The score is obtained from the input variables [42].
Multinomial extension indicates that the probabilities required follow a multino-
mial distribution.
• Logistic Regression: For each given entry, thismodel predicts the probability that
it belongs to one of the categories, using a regression model previously built. A
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decision threshold should be set in order to use this method as a classifier.
10.2.1 Comparison and results
The procedure followed mainly consisted in executing an exhaustive grid search for
each model so as to find which combination of values performed best. In other words,
the idea was to try several values for each parameter of each model. Once that the best
result is obtained for eachmethod, the best from onemethod is comparedwith the best
of the other. Finally, the best one is the chosen one.
In the case of Multinomial Naive Bayes, the best combination of parameters using
python’s module sklearn was: alpha=0.1, fit_prior=True. On the contrary, in the case of
Logistic Regression, the best combination was: class_weight=balanced, fit_intercept=False,
max_iter=100, multi_class=multinomial, solver=newton-cg.
Before starting the comparison, the first step is to check themetrics that will be used.
First of all, we have accuracy, which can be defined as: Accuracy = CorrectPredictions
WrongPredictions
.
The next metric that we have is Precision, which proposes an answer to the question:
Howmanyof the positives predictionswere right?. The formula is: Precision = TP
TP + FP
.
Finally, the last indicator is Recall, which answers the question: How many of the real
positives were correctly identified?. This is the formula: Recall = TP
TP + FN
. With
these concepts clear, in table 10 all of them are compared.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall
Multinomial Naive Bayes 0.987480 0.991762 0.994719
Logistic Regression 0.985733 0.991895 0.992688
Table 11: Comparison between different models forMalicious URL method
Additionally to the previous metrics, in table 12 and 13 can be found the confusion
matrices for both of the previous models.
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Multinomial Naive Bayes Real Good Real Bad
Predicted Good 267,278 2,220
Predicted Bad 1,419 19,748
Table 12: Confusion matrix for Multinomial Naive Bayes forMalicious URL Method
Logistic Regression Real Good Real Bad
Predicted Good 266,911 2,181
Predicted Bad 1,966 19,607
Table 13: Confusion matrix for Logistic Regression forMalicious URL Method
From the previous results, the best chosen model was Multinomial Naive Bayes,
due to the fact thatMultinomial Naive Bayes obtains less FN (understanding negative as
Bad), even though all the other metrics are quite similar in both cases.
10.3 Pool Method
For this method, I applied exactly the same idea than the one applied in the previous
method. The reason is simple, instead of trying to use the URLs to detect malware
patterns, we can use the URLs to detect pools patterns, which are identified by 1.
So again, the entire formalisation of the problem is shown here. Given a dataset
{(u1, y1), ..., (un, yn)}where U = {u1, ..., un}, n ≥ 2, yi ∈ {1, 0} and 1 ≤ i ≥ n.
1. Extract features: ui → xi where xi ∈ Rd, being this a d-dimensional feature vector.
∀v ∈ xi, TFIDF (v, ui, U) = zi. In other words, zi is the TFIDF score of a feature
inside the vector of features obtained from the url ui.
2. Predict: ∀z apply g : Rd → {1, 0}
With this solution, again different models are trained in order to find the best one.
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Due to the fact that now the dataset is much smaller than the previous one, more meth-
ods were studied: Multinomial Naive Bayes,Decision Tree Classifier, K Neighbors Classifier,
Logistic Regression, Random Forest Classifier.
• Decision Tree Classifier: The idea behind this model is simple, just build a tree
where each node is a condition and the each leave is one of the classes.For every
input, a path is followed until one leaf is reached [42].
• KNeighbors Classifier: The idea of KN neighbors is that similar objects are near
to each other. In other words, the algorithm computes the distance, i.e. the differ-
ence between each new entry and a group of neighbours. Locate it to the closest
group, i.e. more probably category.
• RandomForest Classifier: Thismodel consists of a significant number of decision
trees. Each entry is executed on each tree, so each decision tree in the random
forest generates an output (a class prediction). The class mostly predicted is the
final output.
10.3.1 Comparison and results
The procedure is the same than the one from the previous method.
The best combination of parameters for each model using python’s module sklearn
was:
• Multinomial Naive Bayes: alpha=0.05, fit_prior=True.
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In table 14, the comparison can be noticed.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall
Multinomial Naive Bayes 0.998778 0.967391 0.894472
Decision Tree Classifier 0.998800 0.965333 0.900498
K Neighbors Classifier 0.997985 0.943343 0.828358
Logistic Regression 0.998914 0.953086 0.930120
Random Forest Classifier 0.983499 0.139706 0.131034
Table 14: Comparison between different models for POOL method
As in the previous method, confusion matrices are shown in tables 15 to 19.
Multinomial Naive Bayes Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 356 12
Predicted 0 42 43,769
Table 15: Confusion matrix for Multinomial Naive Bayes for POOL Method
Decision Tree Classifier Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 362 13
Predicted 0 40 43,764
Table 16: Confusion matrix for Decision Tree Classifier for POOL Method
K Neighbors Classifier Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 333 20
Predicted 0 69 43,757
Table 17: Confusion matrix for K Neighbors Classifier for POOL Method
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Logistic Regression Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 386 19
Predicted 0 29 43,745
Table 18: Confusion matrix for Logistic Regression for POOL Method
Random Forest Classifier Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 57 351
Predicted 0 378 43,393
Table 19: Confusion matrix for Random Forest Classifier for POOL Method
From the above results, the best option to choose is Logistic Regression, since it
achieves a very good accuracy, precision and recall.
10.4 Flow Method
The idea of this algorithm is to detect the patters noticed on the analysis section,
using metrics related to the quantity of data transmitted. For this purpose, the mod-
els trained are: Multinomial Naive Bayes, Decision Tree Classifier, K Neighbors Classifier,
Logistic Regression, Random Forest Classifier. All of them were explained above.
10.4.1 Comparison and results
One last time, the same procedure is applied now, so the best combination of param-
eters for each model using again python’s module sklearnwas:
• Multinomial Naive Bayes: alpha=0.25, fit_prior=True.
• Decision Tree Classifier:














































In table 20 the comparison between models is performed.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall
Multinomial Naive Bayes 0.613521 0.989972 0.536437
Decision Tree Classifier 0.998683 0.999149 0.999255
K Neighbors Classifier 0.999122 0.999251 0.999679
Logistic Regression 0.981124 0.991825 0.985150
Random Forest Classifier 0.999473 0.999464 0.999893
Table 20: Comparison between different models for Flow method
Additionally to the previousmetrics, in tables 21-24, each confusionmatrix is shown.
Yes means that the flow contains mining activity using Stratum.
Multinomial Naive Bayes Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 5,035 51
Predicted no 4,351 1,953
Table 21: Confusion matrix for Multinomial Naive Bayes for Flow Method
Decision Tree Classifier Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 9,390 8
Predicted no 7 1,985
Table 22: Confusion matrix for Decision Tree Classifier for Flow Method
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K Neighbors Classifier Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 9,343 7
Predicted no 3 2,037
Table 23: Confusion matrix for K Neighbors Classifier for Flow Method
Logistic Regression Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 9,221 76
Predicted no 139 1,954
Table 24: Confusion matrix for Logistic Regression for Flow Method
Random Forest Classifier Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 9,323 5
Predicted no 1 2,061
Table 25: Confusion matrix for Random Forest Classifier for Flow Method
Due to the almost perfect values obtained in the confusion matrix as well as in the
accuracy, precision and recall, there is no doubt that the best model in that case is the
Random Forest Classifier.
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11 Results
As a summary, the best model for each method is:
• Malicious URL Method: Multinomial Naive Bayes
• Pool Method: Logistic Regression
• Flow Method: Random Forest Classifier
In tables 26, 27, 28 are shown their confusion matrices.
Multinomial Naive Bayes Real Good Real Bad
Predicted Good 267,278 2,220
Predicted Bad 1,419 19,748
Table 26: Confusion matrix for Multinomial Naive Bayes forMalicious URL Method
Logistic Regression Real 1 Real 0
Predicted 1 386 19
Predicted 0 29 43,745
Table 27: Confusion matrix for Logistic Regression for POOL Method
Random Forest Classifier Real yes Real no
Predicted yes 9,323 5
Predicted no 1 2,061
Table 28: Confusion matrix for Random Forest Classifier for Flow Method
As it can be noticed in the previous tables, each of the methods chosen performs
quite well. Actually, the Pool Method, Netflow Method obtain very good results. On the
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contrary, Malicious URL Method even achieving good levels of accuracy, precision and
recall, the total number of false positives (predicted goodwhenwas bad) aswell as false
negatives is noticeably in comparison with the other methods.
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12 Conclusions
From this project there is a main conclusion that can be extracted, which is that cryp-
tomining malware can be easily identified with the appropriate tools. This was in fact
the main goal of this project, the study of this possibility and its development.
The development of the previous idea led me to the definition of three machine
learning methods, each one of them based on a very specific feature of this type of
malware. Each method performed reasonably well, specially in the case of detecting
patterns in flow and detecting connections to pools, but the second main conclusion
can be obtained here, since none of these methods should stand alone. The reason is
simple, none of them by themselves are enough to ensure that cryptomining malware
will be detected. In the case of the detection based on the malicious URLs, this conclu-
sion can be extracted just from the high number of false positives and false negatives.
However, this is understandable from the point of view that what defines themalicious
intention of an URL is its content. Even though in this project has been proved that the
URLs can contain hints to detect malicious content (since the results obtained are not
bad), in many cases this hints are not enough to detect the reality behind each URL, so
a false prediction is obtained.
For the case of detection using flowmetrics, the main problem is when mining mal-
ware does not use Stratum protocol. Actually, the idea that miners will use Stratum
is a strong assumption, and if it is not use and the alternative is not related to it, the
identification will be compromised.
Finally, in the case of the identification using pools, if the attackers use proxies or
private pools, thismethodwill not work. Clearly this is not a general rule, as it is not the
usage of a non-Stratum protocol, because otherwise the results would have been worse,
but themain conclusion that should be clear is that eachmethod is highly susceptible to
failure if no others mechanisms are applied. For this reason, working with all of three
methods offer a much secure proven alternative.
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12.1 Future work
Since the time to develop the project is very limited, many interesting ideas were
removed, so in case of having the opportunity, they could be retaken and explored
deeper.
One of this ideas involved the identification of different types of cryptocurrencies by
the identification of pools and flow metrics. With the union of both methods, a new
step after the initial detection of miners could be added.
Another interesting idea would be to modify flow method so as to it could be able
to detect non-Stratum traffic too. The same idea of method expansion can be also ap-
plied to pools method, by studying a mechanism that would allow the identification of
connections to proxies with the intention to mine.
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